What of costs? The drug costs of ®rst-line treatment can be as little as $10 for a six-month course. In the developed world the cost of second-line treatment can be in the $10 000sÐclearly beyond the scope of most countries. The proponents of`DOTS plus' point out that unless we aim to treat and cure MDRTB patients wherever they are, we may be building up an unmanageable burden of MDRTB for the future. They also point out that the costs of second-line drugs have come down, in some instances by 90%, and more pressure on the pharmaceutical companies might force prices down even more, as has now happened with drugs for HIV infection. After all, they argue, these drugs have been off patent for decades. But there are others who argue that second-line drugs will always be too expensive for the poorest countries where TB is endemic, and treatment of MDR has a low success rate even in the best hands.
The main dif®culty with lengthy treatment is that patients default. Completion of treatment requires a team of carers including specially trained nurses. In many cultures TB carries a stigma that has to be overcome. Patients may be afraid they will lose employment and income as a result of the disease; they may not appreciate the threat they pose in spreading disease to the rest of the community; and they may see the insistence on their taking tablets as an infringement of rights. Patients who default from treatment can usually be helped: a skilled and motivated staff will ®nd ways to combat their practical or emotional dif®culties. Also, most countries have laws to enable compulsory detention when an individual with a dangerous infectious disease such as MDRTB refuses treatment. In practice this is seldom used, though some countries such as the USA have employed compulsory detention in as many as 1% of cases 11 .
Tuberculosis is a disease of poverty, and world poverty is worsening, both in terms of inequality of wealth distribution and the numbers in absolute poverty. Whether by omission or commission, those of us in the developed world are bene®ting materially from deprivation in the rest of the world 12 . John le Carre Â, in his latest novel The Constant Gardener, which includes an account of the trial of a new TB drug in East Africa, remarks that`the problem with the poor is always the same. They are not rich enough to buy expensive medicines'. More prophetically he adds, [The plan] is to test the pill in Africa for two or three years, by which time [the pharmaceutical company] calculate the TB will have become a big problem in the West' 13 . For two to three years read twenty to thirty. We have been warned. cross protective, so the variant of the type in the vaccine must be matched as closely as possible with the strain circulating in nature. The Pan Asian O strain, the cause of the present outbreak, differs from the previously prevalent strains in Europe (e.g. OBFS, OLausanne, OKaufbeuren) but is closely similar to OManisa, a widely used vaccine strain ®rst isolated in 1969. The latest FMD vaccines are purer and more potent than their forerunners and give at least partial protection even if the match is not perfect. Cross-neutralization studies indicate that the vaccine in the strategic reserve (OManisa) would give good protection against the outbreak strain. Another aspect of modern vaccines is the speed at which protection is generated 1 . Thus in cattle a single dose begins to protect by 4 daysÐ although in pigs it takes longer, about 21 days.
One often-mentioned drawback of vaccination strategies is the dif®culty of establishing whether antibodies found are due to infection or vaccination. In fact, these two sorts of response can now be distinguished: a method that seems convenient and reliable 2 is to use an enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) for antibodies to a long B peptide from one of the nonstructural proteins of FMD virus that are present only in infected animals. A second worry is that infected vaccinated animals can become carriers. In experiments such as those described by Doel et al. 1 about half the animals became carriers of virus in the pharynx, but these were exposed to massive challenge from contact with infected pigs soon after immunization. Under natural conditions carrier rates would be lower because of less intense and later challenge. Moreover, carrier animals in most experiments did not transmit infection to controls 3 , though clearly there is a risk. A third concern is food safety. However, there is plenty of evidence that products from vaccinated (and even infected) animals are safe. In Continental Europe vaccination was for many decades the general policy to control the disease, before the slaughter policy was introduced in 1992; no human-health issues arose. In the wake of the BSE ®asco, assurances that there is no danger might not be believed by a disillusioned public, but the level of anxiety does not seem highÐan opinion poll in April suggested that most people would buy meat that came from a vaccinated animal.
If vaccine is used to control an epizootic, what happens to vaccinated animals once the outbreak has been dealt with? It would seem logical to slaughter all animals shown by a test such as that proposed by Shen et al. 2 to be infected. Before the idea of vaccination was effectively shelved, Government policy (according to its website) was to vaccinate cattle in infected areas before they were turned out to grass and then let them live out their commercial lives whether they had been infected or not. Clearly this policy would have postponed the country's return to an FMD-free state; but one can understand the opposition of farmers to vaccination of healthy animals if this merely offered a stay of execution when without vaccination an uninfected animal might be allowed to survive. Another control strategy in infected areas would be to supplement existing measures by vaccination within 3 km of an infected farm, thus buying time for the hard-pressed authorities to slaughter animals and safely dispose of their carcasses. But if the country wished to regain its FMD-free status, these animals would ultimately have to be slaughtered.
When the British epizootic comes to an end, policies on FMD will need to be reconsidered. In particular, the review should include cost-bene®t analyses such as were done before the European Commission adopted its import control and slaughter policy in 1992. The picture may have changed. With the continuing increase in international exchange of people and goods, more importations of FMD into diseasefree areas seem inevitable. These trends, coupled with advances in vaccine technology, particularly the possible development of synthetic peptide vaccines that allow very rapid production in response to new strains, have strengthened the case for vaccination as the bedrock of control. But vaccination is not a trivial exercise. Though a single dose is recommended for outbreak control, routine immunization requires a primary course of two doses 3±4 weeks apart, a booster at 4±6 months and thereafter, for cattle, an annual booster; sheep have the same schedule but lower doses, and for pigs the question of boosters depends on the husbandry and the time to slaughter. The next consideration is the type and strain to use. In Europe, with O virtually the only type likely to arise, vaccination could safely be con®ned to this single type, but global monitoring of strains and types is clearly essential, as already done by the World Reference Laboratory at the Institute for Animal Health, Pirbright. A vaccination programme will be most effective if it incorporates modern techniques of diagnosisÐ differential serology to distinguish vaccinated animals from those infected, and a rapid PCR-based test on the farm for current infection. The decision whether to vaccinate routinely must take account of commercial factors; but if we simply consider animal welfare and the previous successes of vaccination as a component of programmes to eradicate the disease from large geographical areas, the choice is clear.
